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The Emerging Law of Ocean Space
For centuries man's predominant activities in the ocean space
have been fishing and navigation where water has facilitated the move-
ment of trade and military power.
Major scientific and technological advances, both conceptual and
practical, of the past two decades have produced a new picture of
ocean space activity. Man now has the ability and the political and
economic incentives to occupy ocean space, and he is embarked upon
intensive research, development, application, and evaluation of ocean
space activities as an extension of his dry-land activities. The addi-
tional environment of the water of ocean space must be reckoned with
and requires new perspective on disparate political, social, economic
and legal interests and attitudes.
Total ocean space-water surface, water column, seabed, and
subsoil-has a broad spectrum of diverse and often conflicting uses:
expansion of navigation and fishing, extraction of oil and gas, harvest-
ing of both fixed and migratory underseas "crops" at various levels
and temperatures of submarine strata, extraction of chemicals from
seawater, mining of ores from the seabed and subsoil, human habita-
tion on the seabed, waste disposal, scientific research, and military
testing.
The simultaneous existence of a traditional water instrumentality
orientation and the newer water environment orientation heightens
disparate interests and conflicting uses of ocean space. In the per-
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spective of the new uses of ocean space, modern maritime law has a
central concern with the orderly entry of man into the earth's last
geographic frontier.
The Changing Nature of Maritime Law
During the medieval period, several states, e.g. Venice, Denmark,
and England, claimed broad rights over portions of the high seas.
The matter assumed its modern form with the promulgation of Papal
Bulls in 1493 which purported to demarcate, by an imaginary line
100 leagues west of the Azores, Portuguese rights to the east and
Spanish rights to the west of the line. Hugo Grotius, the Father of
International Law, partly established his fame as a champion of
freedom of the high seas as a principle of the law of nations. He was
no theoretical dreamer, but a great advocate. The English translation
of the title of his "Brief" in 1609 for the Dutch in the forum of world
public opinion is "The Freedom of the Seas" or "The Right which
Belongs to the Dutch to Take Part in the East Indian Trade"-in other
words, the freedom of the Dutch to navigate the Indian Ocean and to
break into the Portuguese monopoly of the East Indies spice trade.
By the close of the 17th century, freedom of the high seas had
gradually gained recognition as a general legal principle but it has
ever since been shaped and reshaped by the same politico-economic
reality which gave it birth.
No coastal state, even though recognizing the freedom of the
high seas, is willing to say that the free seas touch its very shores.
The need and desire of coastal states to exercise jurisdiction over the
waters along their coasts, to some distance from shore, crystallized
into the now traditional doctrines of internal waters, the territorial
sea, and the contiguous zone of the high sea. Internal waters and the
territorial sea zone are sovereign territory of the coastal state; beyond
it in a contiguous zone of the high sea, the coastal state may exercise
a special jurisdiction for the purpose of its law enforcement and na-
tional security. No state today disputes the existence of these zones,
but their width is still very much disputed.
With the close of World War II, there came the realization that the
continental shelf is a vast reservoir of natural resources, the exploita-
tion of which was gradually becoming technologically possible. In
1945 President Truman proclaimed United States "jurisdiction and
control" over its adjacent continental shelf.1 By 1958 some 20 states
1 Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 59th Stat. 884, Sep. 28, 1945.
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had claimed rights in their continental shelves varying from special
and limited jurisdiction to sovereignty of the shelf and its superjacent
high seas.2 In view of this explosive situation and of the older out-
standing problems, the United Nations decided to take action.
In 1947 the General Assembly created the International Law
Commission (ILC) to assist in the codification and "progressive de-
velopment" of international law.' When the ILC met for the first time
in 1949, it had before it a memorandum from the Secretary General
regarding possible subjects for codification, which included the follow-
ing statement:
It must be a matter for consideration whether, of all the
branches of international law, that of the law of the sea does not
lend itself to comprehensive treatment by way of codifying the
entire branch of the law. A codification-in its widest sense-
of the entire field of the law of the sea in a unified and integrated
"restatement" or similar more ambitious, instrument would go
far towards enhancing the authority both of the work of codi-
fication and of international law as a whole. 4
The ILC selected for codification the law of the sea. After a
number of intermediate drafts and reports, the Commission finally, in
1956, adopted a body of rules, with commentaries, concerning the
law of the sea.' It was impossible to say whether these rules were
merely a restatement of existing law, thus being "codification," or
whether they were proposals for the creation of new law and, there-
fore, "progressive development" of law. In preparing the rules, ILC
had become convinced that such a distinction could not be maintained,
since the detailed elaboration of accepted law had often proved to
involve the formulation of new law as well. Because the two elements
were intermingled in its draft, ILC proposed that an international
conference be summoned to examine the law of the sea
taking account not only of the legal but also of the technical
biological, economic and political aspects of the problem, and
to embody the results of its work in one or more international
conventions or such other instruments as it may deem appro-
priate.6
2 United Nations, "Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the High Seas,"
U. N. Legislative Series, ST/LEG/SER. B/I, 11 Jan. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. I, and
Supplement ST/LEG/SER. B/8, 1959, Vol. 1, Ch. I.
U. N. Gen. Ass. Res. 174(11), 21 Nov. 1947.
U. N. Survey of Int. Law, para. 73, 1949.
6 U. N. Yearbook of the Int. Law Commission, 1956, Vol. II, pp. 254-301.
6 U. N. Gen. Ass., Official Records: 11 th Sess., 1956, Supp. No. 9, para. 28.
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The eleventh General Assembly approved this proposal, and the
Conference met a year later at Geneva from February 24 to April 27,
1958. It was attended by representatives of 86 states-that is, practi-
cally all the then members of the United Nations and the specialized
agencies.
The Conference on the Law of the Sea brought to light a wide
variety of conflicting interests between states and groups of states. It
did not succeed in reconciling all these conflicts and failed to settle
the width of the territorial sea.7 Nevertheless, the Conference adopted
four important conventions, the provisions of which are based to a
very considerable extent on the draft ILC rules. The subjects of
these treaties or conventions are: the Territorial Sea and the Contig-
uous Zone,8 the High Seas,' Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas,1" and the Continental Shelf." The Con-
ference also adopted an optional protocol on settlement of disputes 12
and a number of resolutions.'1
Each of these Conventions came into force between the ratifying
states 30 days after receiving 22 ratifications. This occurred between
1962 and 1966. The United States has ratified all of them. 4
It is likely that the Conventions will receive more ratifications,
but it is expected that some states will not ratify them. For the latter
states the law of ocean space will continue to be the relevant principles
of customary international law, supplemented by arrangements with
particular states. It is not likely that major difficulties will arise be-
cause of the lack of direct acceptance of the Conventions by some
states. Past experience indicates that such states will follow, on a
basis of reciprocity, the important general principles embodied in the
Conventions.
A growing number of states have adopted national legislation
regarding exploration and exploitation of ocean space of concern to
them.
United States authority over lands underlying its territorial sea
7 As did, also, a 1960 Conference although it was convened for that very
purpose.
8 15 U.S. Treaty Series 1606, entered into force for the U. S. Sep. 10, 1964.
9 450 United Nations Treaty Series 82; 13 U.S. Treaty Series 2312, entered
into force for the U. S. Sep. 30, 1962.
10 52 Am. J. Int. L. 851, entered into force for the U. S. March 20, 1966.
11 15 U.S. Treaty Series 471, entered into force for the U. S. June 10, 1964.
12 450 United Nations Treaty Series 170.
13 52 Am. J. Int. L. 864.
14 See notes 8-11, above.
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was granted to the coastal States of the United States by the Sub-
merged Lands Act.' 5 However, the United States retained "all its
navigational servitude and rights in and powers of regulation and con-
trol of said lands and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes
of commerce, navigation, national defense, and international
affairs." 11
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act " subjects the adjacent
shelf to the "jurisdiction, control and power of disposition" of the
United States 11 and makes applicable to the shelf, and to installations
for resource exploitation, the "Constitution and laws and civil and
political jurisdiction of the United States." "
The United States Coast Guard is authorized to provide "reason-
able regulations with respect to lights and other warning devices,
safety equipment, and other matters relating to the promotion of
safety of life and property" on the installations and adjacent waters.2"
The United States Army Corps of Engineers is authorized to
grant permits for installations in the superjacent waters of the con-
tinental shelf.2
The United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land
Management, is responsible for the administration of leasing oil, gas,
and mineral rights on the shelf.22
The Geneva Conventions and present national legislation are, of
course, not the final word. One lesson of legal history is that work-
able rules of law cannot be abstractly prefabricated; they can only
be derived from experience.
However, as a result of the Geneva Conventions, their traveaux
preparatoire, and national legislation, the outlines of a body of
national and international law for the orderly conduct of ocean space
activity are becoming more clear, as are the parameters and dimen-
sions of still unsolved legal needs. To a large extent, a period of legal
conjecture is ending. Government and the mushrooming ocean space
industry is now confronted with a period of needed intensive study,
evaluation, and development of the application of existing general
principles of law to the expanding ocean space activity.
1' 67 Stat. 29; 43 U.S.C. 1301-1315 (1964).
16 43 U.S.C. 1314 (1964).
1 67 Stat. 462; 43 U.S.C. 1331-1343 (1964).
18 43 U.S.C. 1332(a) (1964).
10 43 U.S.C. 1333(a) (1) (1964).
20 43 U.S.C. 1333(e) (1964).
21 43 U.S.C. 1333(f) (1964).
22 43 U.S.C. 1334 (1964).
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The overall problem is to evolve policies and a legal regime
which will maximize all beneficial uses of ocean space. Within this
overall problem at least three broad categories of legal problems are
readily identifiable: (1) The problems peculiar to maximizing each
separate use of ocean space. (2) Accommodating or reconciling con-
flicting uses. (3) Jurisdiction to effectuate the solution of the two
foregoing problems. Moreover, there is an interaction among these
three sets of problems, so that any given solution to any one of them
will have an effect on the other two. Therefore, the point of departure
for their examination must be an arbitrary decision. It seems most
helpful to approach the use problems within the context of discussion
of the jurisdictional zones into which ocean space is divided.
The Problems of Ocean Space Zones
The cardinal principle of freedom of the high seas has long been
recognized as inappropriate for all ocean areas. Therefore, it is also
recognized that ocean areas adjacent to coasts must, as a practical
matter, be considered as an appurtenance to the coastal state's jurisdic-
tion over its land territory.
The principle of national jurisdiction in a marginal sea area gives
rise to two problems: (1) What are the contents of this jurisdiction?
(2) What are the boundaries of the area over which it extends? These
two problems may seem to be separate and distinct. In practice they
cannot be separated because the more absolute the coastal state's
authority, the greater is the interest of other states in a narrow width
of such authority. Conversely, the wider the area of the coastal state's
authority, the greater is the interest of other states in reducing the con-
tent of the coastal state's authority therein.
Over a long period the practice of states has evolved a pragmatic
solution to this problem. Traditional maritime law divides ocean
space into four zones in which the coastal state's authority becomes
less and less absolute seaward until it becomes merged into the com-
mon right of all states to the freedom of the high seas: (1) internal
waters, (2) territorial sea, (3) contiguous zone (law enforcement),
and (4) high seas. To these four zones the emerging law of ocean
space has now added: (5) continental shelf, (6) contiguous zone
(fisheries), and (7) deep sea bottom.
The Baseline or Legal Coastline (Fig. 1)
The legal coastline, or baseline, is not a boundary but it is of
primary importance for two reasons: (1) It is the line from which
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THE BASELIflE
FROM WHICH THE TERRITORIAL SEA IS MEASURED
Fig. 1-From U.S. Dept. of State, "Sovereignty of the Sea," Geographic
Bulletin No. 3, April 1965, Pub. No. 7849.
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all maritime boundaries are delimited, mediately or immediately.
(2) The further seaward the coastline is drawn the greater is the
coastal states' encroachment upon freedom of the high seas.
"[T]he normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the terri-
torial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-
scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State." 2 Elsewhere
the baseline is a straight line across rivers, estuaries, or the mouth of
bays 21 or rivers or a system of straight lines between "appropriate
points" along a coast deeply fringed with islands. -" (Fig. 2)
"Waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial
sea from part of the internal waters of the State." 26 "The outer limit
of the territorial sea is the line every point of which is at a distance
from the nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of the
territorial sea." 27
The Submerged.Lands Act does not use the term "baseline"; it
uses the term "coast line" defined as "the line of ordinary low water
along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the
open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters." 2'
The Act does not define "inland waters" and neither the Act nor
the Convention define "low water."
THE STRAIGHT BASELInE
RLOnG DEEPLY InDEnTED COAST OR onE FRINGED WITH ISLnDS
HIGH SEAS
(Also Continental Shelf)
TERRITORIAL SEA INTERNAL WATER
SEGMENT OF STRAIGHT BASELINE
OTRLIMIT OF THE
TERRITORIAL SEA
Fig. 2-From U.S. Dept. of State, "Sovereignty of the Sea," Geographic
Bulletin No. 3, April 1965, Pub. No. 7849.
23 Cony. on Terr. Sea, Art. 3.
24 Id., Art. 7(2)-(5).
2s5 Id., Art. 4 (1) -(5).
26 Id., Art. 5 (1).
27 Id., Art. 6.
2 43 U.S.C. 1301(c) (1964).
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The Interpretation of "Coast Line"
Congress left for adjudication the interpretation of the definition
of "coast line" in the Act. In the 1965 case of U.S. v. California 2
the Government argued that because the Act came in point of time
before the Convention the latter should not be used to interpret the
former. The Supreme Court rejected this view, saying:
We do not think that the Submerged Lands Act has so restricted
us. . . . It is our opinion that we best fill our responsibility of
giving content to the words which Congress employed by adopt-
ing the best and most workable definitions available. The Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
approved by the Senate and ratified by the President, provides
such definitions. We adopt them for the purposes of the Sub-
merged Lands Act. This establishes a single coastline for both
the administration of the Submerged Lands Act and the conduct
of our future international relations (barring an unexpected
change in the rules established by the Convention). Further-
more, the comprehensiveness of the Convention provides
answers to many of the lesser problems related to coastlines
which, absent the Convention, would be most troublesome.30
Thus international legal criteria are to be used in interpreting
the coast line definition of the Act.
The "Line of Ordinary Low Water"
The first element of the legal "coast line" is the "line of ordinary
low water."
To define "low water" the character of the tide must be con-
sidered. Along the coasts of the United States there are three prin-
cipal types of tides-the daily, the semi-daily, and the mixed.
A daily tide has only one high and one low water in the tidal day
of 24.84 solar hours.
A semi-daily tide has in a tidal day two substantially equal high
waters and two substantially equal low waters.
A mixed tide has in a tidal day two high waters and two low
waters but there is substantial inequality in successive high waters, or
in successive low waters, or in both.
Along the Pacific coast the tide is of the mixed type. The Gov-
ernment argued in the 1965 California case that therefore "ordinary
low water" on the California coast should be taken as the mean of
21 381 U.S. 139.
30 381 U.S. 139, 164-165.
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all the low tides. California argued it should be the mean of only the
lower low tides, i.e. "mean low water." The Court adopted the latter
view, saying:
We hold that California's position represents the better view
of the matter. The Submerged Lands Act defines coastline in
terms of the 'line of ordinary low water.' The Convention
(Art. 3) uses 'the low-water line along the coast as marked on
large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal state'
(i.e., the United States). We interpret the two lines thus indi-
cated to conform, and on the official United States coastal
charts prepared by the United States Coast and Geodetic Sur-
vey, it is the lower low water line which is marked. 1
Following the above reasoning of the Court, the line of "or-
dinary low water" on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts would be the tidal
datum plane used by the Coast and Geodetic Survey for charting
water depths on nautical charts for those coasts.
On the Atlantic coast the tide is of the semi-daily type and so
the nautical charts of it show water depths from the mean of all the
low tides as "mean low water."
On the Gulf coast the tide is predominately of the daily type
but there are two variations: (1) There are times during each month
when the daily tide becomes semi-daily. (2) At two stretches along
the Florida coast the tide is mixed.
If the procedure developed for determining mean low water
where the tide is of the semi-daily or mixed type were applied to the
type of daily tide found in the Gulf, it would be statistically unsound
because an imbalance would be created by the use of both low waters
on days when the Gulf tide becomes semi-daily. Therefore, the tidal
engineers of the Coast and Geodetic Survey have developed a proce-
dure whereby the Gulf tide at such times is considered as if it were
always of the daily type. In other words, on those days when there
are two low tides only the lower of the two lows is used in arriving at
the tidal datum plane of "mean low water" from which water depths
are charted for the Gulf.
Seaward Limits of Inland Waters
The second element of the legal "coast line" is "the line marking
the seaward limit of inland waters."
In the 1965 California case the Supreme Court defined "inland
waters" as "waters landward of the baseline of the territorial sea, which
31381 U.S. 139, 176.
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are now recognized as internal waters of the United States under the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone." 3"
Determining the location of the baseline, or fictitious coastline,
which marks the seaward limit of inland waters involves two separate
facets: (1) bays and (2) islands fringing a coast.
Bays
It is recognized in the Convention on the Territorial Sea " (and
by the Supreme Court in the 1965 California case 4") that a bay is
inland water landward of a baseline across its entrance. However, the
term "bay" as actually applied in common usage is so indefinite as
not to be susceptible of precise definition which is at once inclusive
and exclusive of inland waters. In international law there are two kinds
of bays which are inland waters: (1) historic bays and (2) juridical
bays.
A historic bay, as defined by the Supreme Court in the 1965
California case, is "a bay over which the United States has traditionally
asserted and maintained dominion with the acquiescence of foreign
nations." "
The definition of a juridical bay is laid down in Art. 7 of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea. This definition was used by the
Supreme Court in the 1965 California case. ' The gist of it is that a
bay is a well-marked coastal indentation landward of a baseline or
baselines across its mouth, the sum of which does not exceed 24
nautical miles, which indentation has an area, including islands
within it, at least as great as the area of a semicircle whose diameter
equals the length of the baseline or the sum of the baselines if the
indentation has more than one mouth. (Fig. 1)
Islands Fringing a Coast
Where islands fringe a mainland the problem is whether the
intervening water is, or may be claimed as, in land waters, in which
case "the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters" is a straight
baseline across the entrances between the islands or whether the legal
"coast line" is the "ordinary low water" line of the mainland and the
outer island coasts, in which case the intervening water is either ter-
32 382 U.S. 448, 450, Supp. Decree, Jan. 31, 1966.
3 Art. 7(4).
34 382 U.S. 448, 450, Supp. Decree, Jan. 31, 1966.
35 Id.
36 Id.
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ritorial sea or high seas depending upon the distance of the islands
from the mainland. The Submerged Lands Act furnishes no guidance
for the solution of this problem.
Article 4 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea permits, but
does not make mandatory, the limited use of straight baselines to and
from and between islands fringing a coast.3" (Fig. 2) Before the Con-
vention, the United States did not recognize such baselines in its
international relations and it will doubtlessly continue to be conserva-
tive in this regard. In the 1965 California case the Government op-
posed the use of straight baselines to and between the Channel islands
and its position was upheld by the Supreme Court.3
Charting the "Ordinary Low Water" Line
The Supreme Court's above quoted reference to official United
States charts is somewhat misleading in implying that the entire low
water line is marked on nautical charts prepared by the Coast and
Geodetic Survey.
Sea boundaries must eventually be laid out on maps or charts.
Nautical charts available for this purpose provide the best map base
for delimitation of these boundaries. Nautical charts, however, are
made for the mariner and while they provide most of the information
for delimiting the low water line, they do not always provide all of
the needed information.
The normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial
sea is the low-water line as marked on large scale charts. "Large
scale" may be defined as scale ratios of 1/80,000 or larger. All of the
Atlantic and Gulf coastline of the United States is covered by
1/80,000 scale charts. Most of the Pacific coastline of the country is
covered by a series of charts at scales ranging from about 1/200,000
to 1/300,000. Only comparatively small sections of the Pacific coast
are covered at larger scales and some of the Alaska coastline is
covered only by small scale charts.
The normal baseline (low-water line) has not been surveyed and
charted for all of the coasts of the United States. Further, this line
must be considered an ambulatory line along a changeable coast-
line.3" These facts do not, however, represent an insurmountable
37 Art. 4 must be interpreted and applied in the light of the consideration that
it is a "codification" and "progressive development" of the Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116.
38 381 U.S. 139, 167-169.
39 U. S. v. Calif., 382 U.S. 448, 449, Supp. Decree, Jan. 31, 1966.
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handicap. Present day methods of using tide controlled infrared and
color aerial photography provide a fairly rapid and reasonably eco-
nomical means of mapping the low-water line. The proposed Con-
tinental Shelf program of the Coast and Geodetic Survey includes a
long-range program for mapping some of the low-water line each
year on a priority basis.
Offshore Boundaries of the States
The thirteen original States organized the United States by rati-
fying the Articles of Confederation and, later, the Constitution. The
boundaries of the original States were not defined in their Acts of
ratification but in general they maintained by Constitution or statute
their claim to their colonial boundaries which had been established by
royal decree or by agreement.
Since later States of the United States were admitted by Acts of
Congress and their boundaries were defined by such Acts,"° the States
cannot determine their boundaries either unilaterally or by agreement
among themselves. Since Congress cannot change the boundary of
a State once admitted without its consent, changing a State's boundary
requires both Congressional and State action,4 but Congressional ap-
proval of State action initially establishes the State's boundary."'
Coastal boundaries of the States fall into two categories accord-
ing to their general direction in relation to the coast. Outer boundaries
follow the general direction of the coast between Federal and State
offshore territory; lateral boundaries between adjacent States extend
from shore through the territorial sea to the State's outer boundaries.
In theory, each coastal State has had from its beginning outer
and lateral coastal boundaries. The theoretical existence of these
boundaries, however, stands in stark contrast to the fact that complete
criteria for their delimitation do not yet exist. However, as a result of
recent litigation and the Submerged Lands Act, criteria for delimita-
tion are now emerging.
Outer Coastal Boundaries of the States
Although no definition of inland (or internal) waters appears in
any description of colonial boundaries or in any Act of admission,
it was early established that the original States had inherent sovereignty
40 U.S. v. La., 363 U.S. 1, 35 (1960).
41 Poole v. Fleager, 11 Peters 207 (1837).
42 Note 40, above.
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of inland waters by succession to the rights of the Crown. 3 Subse-
quently admitted coastal States acquired the same rights by admis-
sion on an "equal footing." "
In the Submerged Lands Cases the Supreme Court held that the
foregoing inherent sovereignty rationale did not apply to the terri-
torial sea.4" The "reversal" of these cases by the Submerged Lands
Act necessitated an overall Congressional approval and confirmation
of the outer boundaries of the coastal States.
Section 4 of the Submerged Lands Act 46 provides:
(1) Each original State's outer boundary is 'approved and con-
firmed' as a line three nautical miles from its 'cost line.'
(2) Any non-original coastal State's outer boundary which
has been extended three nautical miles from its 'coast line' is
'approved and confirmed.'
(3) Any non-original coastal State may extend its outer bound-
ary three nautical miles from its 'coast line.'
(4) The foregoing provisions do not prejudice any Gulf State's
claim to an outer boundary up to three maritime leagues when
it entered the Union or if its claim was subsequently approved by
Congress."
The five Gulf States claimed an outer boundary at three leagues
(nine nautical miles) from the "coast line." The claim of Texas was
upheld on the ground it had such a boundary when it entered the
Union.4" The claim of Florida was upheld on the ground that Con-
gress had approved its 1868 constitution which specified a three
league boundary in the Gulf.' The claim of the other three Gulf
States was found to be historically unjustified.5"
Since the United States claims internationally only a three mile
territorial sea, the domestic extension of the outer boundary of Texas
and Florida beyond three miles and within nine miles must be re-
43 Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410 (1842).
44 Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845).
45U. S. v. Calif., 332 U.S. 19 (1947); U. S. v. La., 339 U. S. 699 (1950);
U. S. v. Tex., 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
46 43 U.S.C. 1312 (1964).
47 Here 43 U.S.C. 1312 (1964) must be read in the light of 43 U.S.C. 1301
(1964).
48 U. S. v. La., et al., 363 U.S. 1, 36-64 (1960).
49 U. S. v. Fla., 363 U.S. 121 (1960).
50 N. 1, 363 U.S. 1, 66-79 (La.), 79-82 (Miss.), 82 (Ala.) (1960).
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garded internationally as a grant by the United States of its rights in
the Continental shelf between three and nine miles.51
Lateral Coastal Boundaries of the States
The Submerged Lands Act does not define the lateral coastal
boundaries between the States. No complete definition of lateral
coastal boundaries appears in any description of colonial boundaries
or in any Act of admission. Most such sources are silent or typically
describe the boundary as running "to the sea." Only three lateral
boundaries have since been delimited, viz:
(1) Massachusetts-New Hampshire: "three miles . . . to the
limit of State jurisdiction" on a specified course.5 2
(2) Connecticut-New York: specified courses and distances
through Long Island Sound and around Fisher's Island. 3
(3) Florida-Alabama: specified course "to the seaward limit"
of each State."
International Lateral Territorial Sea Boundaries of the United States
The northern lateral coastal boundaries of Maine and Washing-
ton, the southern lateral coastal boundaries of California and Texas,
and both lateral boundaries of Alaska are international boundaries.
Definitively complete criteria of their delimitation in the territorial
sea exist only for the Maine-Canadian boundary.
The Maine-Canadian coastal boundary was first described in the
provisional treaty with Great Britain (1782):
East, by a line to be drawn along the middle of the river St.
Croix, from its mouth in the Bay of Fundy... ; comprehending
all islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of
the United States, and lying south of a line 'drawn due east
from' the point 'where the aforesaid boundary shall . . . touch
the Bay of Fundy . . . excepting such islands as now are, or
heretofore have been, within the limits of the said province of
Nova Scotia.' 55
The definite treaty of peace with Great Britain (1783) defined
the boundary in terms similar to those of the provisional treaty.
51 Restatement of the Law, 2d, Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
p. 41.
52 Mass., Act of May 12, 1899, Ch. 369; N.H. Act of Mar. 22, 1901, Ch. 115.
5343 Stat. 731.
54 68 Stat. 77 (1954).
55 Malloy, W. M., Treaties, Conventions . . . Between the U. S. and Other
Powers, 1776-1909, vol. 1, p. 581 (1910).
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The Ghent peace treaty (1814) provided for the appointment
of a commission to settle the status of certain islands in Passama-
quoddy Bay and the island of Grand Manan in the Bay of Fundy. The
commission awarded Moose, Dudley, and Frederick Islands to the
United States and all other islands in Passamaquoddy Bay and the
island of Grand Manan to Great Britain.5
To remove a slight uncertainty about the boundary in Passama-
quoddy Bay, a 1910 treaty with Great Britain laid down the position of
the line by courses and distances, starting from a point between Treat
Island and Campobello Island and running thence in a general
southerly direction "5100 meters to the middle of Grand Manan
Channel." 11
When the foregoing boundary was surveyed its terminus was
found to be less than three nautical miles from the shore line of both
Grand Manan Island and Maine, thus leaving a small area of con-
troversial jurisdiction between the terminus and the three-mile limit.
A 1925 treaty with Great Britain extended the boundary "through
the middle of Grand Manan Channel to the High Seas." 11
The Washington-Canadian coastal boundary was first described
in the 1846 treaty with Great Britain as "along the said forty-ninth
parallel of north latitude to the middle of the channel which separates
the continent from Vancouver's Island; and thence southerly through
the middle of the said channel, and of Fuca's Straits, to the Pacific
Ocean." "
A disputed boundary through the Straits of Georgia and Juan
de Fuca was settled by arbitration, the award describing the boundary
terminus as "to the Pacific Ocean at a point equidistant between
Bonilla Point on Vancouver Island and Tatooch Island lighthouse
on the American shore." 60
The Alaskan-Canadian lateral boundary in the Artic Ocean is not
defined, the land boundary being delimited as the 141st meridian "as
far as the Frozen ocean." 61
The Alaskan-Canadian lateral boundary in the Pacific through
Dixon entrance came under dispute and was referred to arbitration.
The arbitral award delimited the boundary on an annexed map as a
56 Id., pp. 612, 619.
51 Id., (Redmond) vol. 3, p. 2616 (1923).
58 44 Stat., pt. 3, p. 2102.
59 Note 55, above, p. 657.
60 Id., p. 725.
61 Id., vol. 2, p. 1521.
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straight line from Cape Muzon to the south end of Tongass Passage,
then through the Passage, up Pearse Canal to Portland Canal and
up Portland Canal to its head." The uncertainty in this delimita-
tion is the exact location of the boundary in the vicinity of Cape
Muzon.
The Texas-Mexican lateral boundary is delimited in the treaty
of Guadalupe-Hidalgo (1848) to "commence in the Gulf of Mexico,
three leagues from land, opposite the mouth of the Rio Grande, . . .
from thence up the middle of that river. . .. ,, " The uncertainty
in this delimitation is the exact location of the middle of the mouth
which probably varies as the river cuts across the sandspit at its mouth
in flood season and then moves northward under the force of along-
shore currents.
The California-Mexican lateral boundary is delimited in the
treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo (1848) on a specified course "to a
point on the coast of the Pacific Ocean ...
Article 12 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea provides,
in effect, that the lateral boundary between adjacent states is "the
median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest
points on the baseline" unless the two states agree otherwise. Thus,
all but one of the United States international lateral boundaries of
the territorial sea remain to be clarified by negotiations with Canada
and Mexico.
The Continental Shelf (Fig. 3)
The geological continental shelf is the submerged land mass
that declines moderately from the coasts of most continents before
descending steeply into the deep ocean. In some places it is as
hilly as New England, quite deep close to the shore and shallow
beyond; in others, it is a gently sloping plain. Off some coasts there
is practically no physical shelf at all; off others, it extends seaward
up to 200 miles.
The development of technological capability for serious exploi-
tation of the shelf, having begun after World War II, was only about
10 years old when the Geneva Conference met in 1958. In 1956,
the ILC considered the depth of 200 meters (600 ft.) would be
62 1d., vol. 1, p. 792.
63 Id., p. 1109.
64 Id.
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Fig. 3-From U.S. Dept. of State, "Sovereignty of the Sea," Geographic
Bulletin No. 3, April 1965, Pub. No. 7849.
the technically practical limit of exploitability for some time.6" The
conferees in 1958 had before them a preparatory document" de-
scribing "the latest technical information concerning the possibility
of exploiting the mineral resources of the subsoil." 17 One inference
possible from this document was that 200 meters would probably
be the reasonable maximum depth of exploitability for the next 20
years, i.e., until 1978." Another projection was that exploitation
of hard minerals need not be taken into account for boundary pur-
poses because either the concentration of minerals was not substan-
tial enough to justify exploitation or, where sufficient concentration
did exist, mining was not feasible. ' The inaccuracy of these pro-
jections is shown by the fact that offshore drilling is now technically
feasible in water depths of 1,000 feet and that hard mining proce-
dures under development or envisaged as technically feasible will
make possible viable ocean mining by private industry as soon as the
cost effectiveness problem is solved. It seems fair to conclude that the
Conference did not envisage the present extent of the ocean oil and
gas operations and did not conceive of the ocean mining problem at all.
65 In the Articles concerning the law of the sea adopted by the ILC in 1956,
Art. 67, U. N. Gen. Ass. Of. Rec., llth Sess., Supp. No. 9 (A/3159), p. 41.
"6 Mouton, M. W., Recent Developments in the Technology of Exploiting the
Mineral Resources of the Continental Shelf, U. N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/25
(1958).
67 Id., p. 5.
Is Id., p. 18.
69 Id., p. 24.
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Article 2 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf recog-
nizes that coastal states have certain exclusive interests in the sea
bottom beyond their territorial sea. The basis for recognizing ex-
clusive interests of the coastal States is state practice and propin-
quity, regarding which the ILC said in its final, 1956 report:
[T]hat practice is considered by the Commission to be sup-
ported by considerations of law and of fact. In particular, once
the seabed and the subsoil have become an object of active
interest to coastal States with a view to the exploration and
exploitation of their resources, they cannot be considered as
res nullius, i.e., capable of being appropriated by the first occu-
pier. It is natural that coastal States should resist any such solu-
tion. Moreover, in most cases the effective exploitation of
natural resources must presuppose the existence of installations
on the territory of the coastal State. Neither is it possible to
disregard the geographical phenomenon, whatever the term-
propinquity, contiguity, geographical continuity, appurtenance
or identity-used to define the relationship between the sub-
marine areas in question and the adjacent nonsubmerged land.70
Once it is conceded that a coastal state has some sort of ex-
clusive interests in the adjacent sea bottom which springs solely from
geographic propinquity without the necessity of actual occupation,
three major problems arise-all of which require striking a balance
between the exclusive interests of the coastal state in its submerged
coastal area and the inclusive interest of all states in the sea bottom
and the freedom of the superjacent water. These three problems are:
(1 ) The nature or content of the coastal state's rights; (2) The seaward
extent of the coastal state's rights; and (3) Accommodating con-
flicting uses of the seabed and the superjacent high seas. These three
problems are interrelated, the resolution of each one affecting the
resolution of the others.
The Nature of the Coastal State's Rights
Prior to and at the Geneva Conference in 1958 there were,
broadly, two different approaches to the matter of defining the nature
of the coastal state's rights in the area beyond its territorial sea.
A group of predominately Latin American states did not restrict
their claims to the sea bottom but claimed sovereignty over the super-
jacent high seas, thus making serious inroads upon the freedoms of
fishing and navigation. These wider claims to sovereignty over the
70 Commentary of the ILC concerning its draft, Art. 68 of 1956, U. N. Gen.
Ass. Obf. Rec., 11th Sess., Supp. No. 9 (A/3159), p. 43.
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superjacent waters were rejected by the ILC and by a large majority
of other states, and the outcome of the Conference leaves no doubt
that such claims are unfounded in law.
On the other hand, claims concerning the sea bottom beyond the
territorial sea were generally accepted. Thus the problem became
one of defining the nature of the exclusive interests of the coastal
states in the sea bottom and at the same time preserving the inclusive
interests of all states in the sea bottom and superjacent waters. The
term "sovereignty" of resources was rejected as too strong and sus-
ceptible of abuse. The phrase "jurisdiction and control" of resources
was rejected as too weak.
The wording finally adopted was "sovereign rights for the pur-
pose of" exploring the shelf and exploiting its resources. 1 This was
meant to imply clearly that rights of property in resources are vested
in the coastal state, that ownership of them cannot pass to others
except by express grant and that the coastal state has all rights reason-
ably necessary for or connected with exploration and exploitation.
This seems to create a new legal concept that a state can have sov-
ereign rights for certain purposes in a certain area without having
sovereignty over that area.
A particular point to be noted is that the Convention does not
prohibit broader claims to sovereignty over the sea bottom unrelated
to natural resources. The significance of this point is that both before
and since the Geneva Conference a number of states, including the
United States, have claimed powers of plenary jurisdiction and con-
trol of the kind ordinarily summed up in the word "sovereignty"
while studiously avoiding the use of that word.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 provides that
the subsoil and seabed of the shelf, as defined in the Act, "appertain
to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and
power of disposition as provided in this Act." 7 That this broad
language was no accident is shown by the Senate Report on the bill:
(1) In Section 3 (a) [1332 (a)] the jurisdiction and ple-
nary control of the United States is extended to the seabed and
subsoil of [the] entire Outer Continental Shelf adjacent to the
shores of the United States instead of merely to the natural
resources of the subsoil and seabed . . . as provided in the bill
as introduced. 3
71 Conv. on the Continental Shelf, Art. 2(1).
72 43 U.S.C. 1332(a) (1964).
73 Sen. Rep. 411, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2.
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The Outer Continental Shelf Act seems to contain a few gaps
to be filled by litigation or amendment.
Section 4(a) (1) provides that
The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction
of the United States are hereby extended to the subsoil and
seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands
and fixed structures which may be erected thereon for the
purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, and transport-
ing resources therefrom . . .74 (italics added).
What law, if any, is applicable to "artificial islands and fixed
structures . . . erected thereon" for some purpose other than ex-
ploring and exploiting natural resources, or to a floating platform
(which is not a ship) used for any purpose?
The mystery is deepened by Subsection 4(f) which provides,
without the limitation relating to natural resources, that
The authority of the Secretary of the Army to prevent
obstruction to navigation in the navigable waters of the United
States is hereby extended to artificial islands and fixed structures
located on the outer Continental Shelf. 75
This refers to 33 U.S.C. 403 and 406 (1964) which provides for
criminal penalties and injunctive relief against anyone who builds,
or commences to build, any wharf, pier, bulkhead, or other struc-
ture with a permit from the Secretary of the Army.
The mystery of the applicable law is further deepened by Sub-
section 4(a) (2) of the Act which provides that the civil and criminal
laws of each adjacent State (as of the date of the Act-August 7,
1953), if applicable and not inconsistent with other federal law and
regulations, are federal law "for that portion of the shelf and arti-
ficial islands and fixed structures erected thereon, which would be
within the area of the State if its boundaries were extended seaward"
but without reference to whether the artificial islands and structures
are for the purpose of exploring and exploiting natural resources.7"
There is also a jurisdictional mystery. Subsection 4(b) gives
federal district courts original jurisdiction of cases concerning activi-
ties on the shelf "for the purpose of exploring for, developing, re-
moving or transporting by pipeline the natural resources, or involving
rights to the natural resources." 7
74 43 U.S.C. 1333(a)(1) (1964).
75 43 U.S.C. 1333(f) (1964).
76 43 U.S.C. 1333(a) (1) (1964).
77 43 U.S.C. 1333(b) (1964).
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What court, if any, has jurisdiction of operations not for a
purpose relating to natural resources? The general civil and admiralty
federal jurisdiction would exist under the proper circumstances, but
if otherwise it seems improbable that a State court would have juris-
diction.
The answer to some of these mysteries is now being litigated
in the case of U.S. v. Ray.
In the Ray case the defendants were denied a permit by the
Secretary of the Army to create by dredging a 20 acre artificial island
for the purpose of a resort and ship servicing store on Triumph Reef
just outside territorial waters southeast of Florida. The defendants
nevertheless proceeded to dredge and the United States sought in-
junctive relief under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.
A temporary restraining order was made in an unreported
opinion of April-21, 1965, in which the court (U.S.D.C., S.D. of
Fla.) found as a fact that the defendants' activities "have and will"
destroy "the living coral reef of the area" but made no finding of
fact in the statutory language that the defendants' activities were "for
the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing and transporting"
natural resources of the shelf.
The court's conclusions of law were: (1) It has jurisdiction.
(2) The continental shelf adjacent to the United States "appertains"
to the United States and is subject to its "jurisdiction, control and
power of disposition." (3) The Secretary of the Army has authority
to prevent obstructions to navigation by artificial islands on the shelf.
(4) A preliminary injunction was justified because the dredging
produced irreparable damage and because of the defendants' defiance
of the Secretary of the Army.
This District Court's conclusion that it has jurisdiction is based
on Subsection 4(b), above, which gives jurisdiction of activities on
the shelf "for the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing or
transporting by pipeline the natural resources, or involving rights to
the natural resources." From this language it would appear that
unless the defendants' dredging be considered "developing, remov-
ing . . . the natural resources," the anomaly exists that no court
has jurisdiction of the defendants' activities in this area of United
States territory.
Assuming the court has jurisdiction, the next issue concerns
the authority of the Secretary of the Army. This matter has been
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raised by an application to intervene in the Ray case filed by Atlantis
Development Corp., Ltd.
Atlantis has argued that the authority of the Secretary of the
Army under Subsection 4(f) has no application to artificial islands
unconnected with exploitation of natural resources.
This argument does not seem sound. The Act declares with-
out qualification as to natural resources that the shelf "appertain[s]
to the United States and [is] subject to its jurisdiction, control and
power of disposition as provided in this Act." 78 The Act then
authorizes oil, gas, and mineral development. In other words, the
Act extended the territorial dominion of the nation to the whole shelf
but authorized only mineral development. Because it authorized only
mineral development of the shelf, it is not surprising that many of the
regulatory provisions of the Act relate exclusively to such enterprise.
The provision extending the authority of the Secretary of the
Army to prevent obstruction to navigation to artificial islands and
fixed structures on the outer continental shelf does not expressly
limit his authority to structures erected in aid of mineral exploitation
and no such limitation may be implied. Again, a look at legislative
history is enlightening. Section 4(f) 71' did not appear in the bill
as introduced, but was added by the same Senate Committee which
amended the bill to extend dominion over the whole substance of
the shelf rather than just the natural resources." The addition was
in response to testimony that the Army Engineers were in fact exer-
cising jurisdiction in aid of navigation beyond the three-mile limit
and as far out as there were federal aids to navigation, or the pro-
tection of coastal shipping warranted such action."
Such jurisdiction had been asserted with respect to the construc-
tion of an oil derrick thirty miles off the coast of the Gulf of Mexico
and with respect to the removal of sunken vessels more than three
miles off shore. It had also been asserted by requiring the constructors
of fish traps more than three miles off shore to obtain permits.8"
While the committee members felt this sort of regulation was
78 Note 72, above.
-9 Note 75, above.
80 Note 73, above, p. 17.
sI Outer Continental Shelf, Hearings before the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, U.S. Sen., 83d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 39-43, 55-56, 101-102,
558-559, 640-642.
82 Letter of May 22, 1953, from Chief of Engineers to Sen. Cordon, Chrm.
Sen. Cmte. on Interior and Insular Affairs, id., p. 640.
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desirable and should be continued, they did not feel it was authorized
under existing law. For this reason they added Section 4(f) to the
bill for the specific purpose of extending to the continental shelf the
same authority to protect navigation as the Secretary possessed under
existing law in the territorial waters of the United States. In short,
Section 4(f) was intended to extend the authority accorded the
Secretary by 33 U.S.C. 403, 406 (1964) to the outer continental
shelf. That authority extends to all structures regardless of their
purpose and is clearly not limited to those erected in aid of mineral
exploitation. To accept intervenor's contention that the Secretary
has authority to protect navigation only with respect to structures
erected for purposes of mineral development and not with respect
to structures erected for other purposes, would produce the anomaly
that the Secretary may regulate structures erected for authorized and
lawful purposes but is powerless with respect to structures erected
for unauthorized and unlawful purposes.
A 1964 Netherlands law extends Dutch civil and criminal law
to all installations erected on the Dutch continental shelf for what-
ever purpose. The theoretical justification advanced for this new law
has been described as a "legal vacuum" theory. It has three premises:
(1) Both the international community and the coastal state have legal
interests in the shelf which need protection. (2) To protect these
interests some state must exercise jurisdiction. (3) Propinquity
identifies the adjacent coastal state as the one to fill the vacuum.83
Only the first of these three premises seems legally sound since it
is certainly true that protection of legal interests justifies the exercise of
jurisdiction. The second and third premises seem collectively to
assume that the legal interests of the adjacent coastal states will
always be detrimentally affected by off-shore installations and to
assume that there will be no jurisdiction over shelf installations unless
the coastal state exercises jurisdiction.
Regardless of the soundness of this or other theoretical justi-
fications, it seems that state practice is moving in the direction of a
new rule of law that a coastal state may exercise plenary jurisdiction
and control over the adjacent sea bottom and installations thereon
for all purposes without using the label "sovereignty." Such a rule is
potentially productive of needless controversy involving shadowy
abstractions concerning the nature of sovereignty.
8 See, for a discussion, and text of the law, van Panhuys and van Emde Boas,
"Legal Aspects of Pirate Broadcasting," 60 A.l.I.L. 303 (1966).
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On the other hand, description of the coastal state's rights in
terms of jurisdiction and control, instead of sovereignty, may have
the virtue of preserving flexibility for the pragmatic solution of clashes
of interest regarding how far seaward a coastal state may exercise
jurisdiction and control.
The Seaward Extent of the Rights of Coastal States
According to press reports in November 1966, an effort was
made to establish what the press described as a new nation called
"Abalonia" some 110 miles off San Diego on Cortes Bank. A group
of San Diego businessmen intended to build an artificial island in
the shallow waters (two fathoms) of Cortes Bank and to construct
an abalone and lobster processing plant. Divers would harvest the
area rich in abalone and lobster and virtually unfished.
A surplus concrete reinforced troop ship, 366 feet long, was
obtained and towed to Cortes Bank. There it was moored and the
sea cocks were opened to sink it. But severe seas came up, a mooring
line broke, the ship dragged to deeper water and sank in 35 feet of
water.
According to the press reports, the United States attorney in
San Diego was considering prosecution for establishing a navigation
hazard on the continental shelf without a permit from the Secretary of
the Army. Cortes Bank is some 50 miles beyond San Clemente Island
and the maximum water depth between the Island's territorial sea
and Cortes Bank is 1400 meters. The Island is in turn some 60
miles off San Diego with intervening water depths to 1200 meters.
Query: Is Cortes Bank part of the United States juridical conti-
nental shelf? How wide is the juridical shelf?
The Convention in Article 1 defines the juridical shelf as the area
adjacent to the coasts of mainland or islands, beginning at the outer
boundary of the territorial seabed and extending seaward "to a depth
of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the super-
jacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources."
Subsection 2(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
defines the legal shelf as all submerged lands seaward of the sub-
merged lands granted to the States and "of which the subsoil and sea-
bed appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction
and control." ". Subsection 4(a) (2) refers to the "outer margin"
11'43 U.S.C. 1331(a) (1964).
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of the shelf but nowhere is it defined.85 Other recent legislation in-
corporates the Convention definition 1 and the Convention itself is
part of "the supreme law of the land." Thus the Convention and its
history must be resorted to as in pari materia with the Act.
The literal open-endedness of the Convention's exploitability
test has caused erroneous assertions that it allocates the sea bottom
underlying entire oceans.
Reference has already been made to the evidence that the
Geneva conferees did not conceive of ocean mining nor of exploi-
tation beyond a 200 meter depth. Moreover, the record shows that
both the ILC and the conferees conceived Article 1 to be the defining
of a coastal propinquitous area whose seaward limit was impossible
to resolve satisfactorily.
Article 1 of the Convention is identical with the ILC 1956 draft.
The ILC's commentary on Article 1 explains that its concern was
with the area "contiguous to" or "adjacent to" a coast, an area it
designated as continental shelf "for the purpose of these articles,"
where exploitation was in 1958 possible or probable, even though
some of the area would be beyond the geological shelf.87 The prob-
lem was to find an acceptable verbal formula for describing this area.
In 1951 the ILC adopted exploitability as the criterion after
rejecting the 200 meter criterion of exploitability as too rigid. In
1953 the ILC reversed itself in the light of comments submitted
by some governments and adopted the 200 meter exploitability cri-
terion on the ground that the unlimited exploitability criterion lacked
precision. In 1956 the ILC decided to adopt both criteria in the
present disjunctive form of Article 1. It was felt by a majority of the
ILC that the desirable element of flexibility introduced by the unlimited
exploitability criterion outweighed its impreciseness.88
In 1958 the conferees redebated the ground covered by the ILC
draft, recognizing its advantages and defects, but were unable to
find a better formula to strike a balance between the rigidity of the
200 meter exploitability criterion and the impreciseness of future
exploitability.
The 200 meter depth criterion of propinquity raises a problem
which is illustrated by the "Abalonia" situation: What is the status of
85 43 U.S.C. 1333(a) (2) (1964).
86 P.L. 88-308, 78 Stat. 194-196, prohibiting foreign ships from fishing in the
U.S. territorial sea or taking sedentary species from the U.S. continental shelf.
87 Note 70, above, pp. 41-42.
88 Id.
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seabed of less than 200 meters depth separated from the seabed
immediately adjacent to the shore by a channel deeper than 200
meters? Is such an area, e.g. Cortes Bank, part of the juridical shelf?
The 1956 ILC report expresses the opinion that such a contiguous
area could be considered as a part of the shelf but as an exception
to the general rule and also suggests it ought to be "fairly close" to
the shore and that the intervening channel should be "narrow." "
Cortes Bank is 50 miles from San Clemente and the intervening
maximum depth is 1400 meters. However, before lightly concluding
that this distance and intervening depth place Cortes Bank beyond
the juridical shelf of San Clemente, or the mainland, consideration
must be given to existing assertions of shelf jurisdiction by the United
States.
The United States is now exercising jurisdiction over the adjacent
seabed in the following instances inter alia:
(1) Leasing mineral rights in the Gulf of Mexico in plane
coordinate blocks in depths under 200 meters which are 40-50 miles
from shore; 0
(2) Granting an exploration permit for core drilling in the
Gulf of Mexico in specified general areas in depths of 1100 meters
over 100 miles from shore; 91
(3) Leasing, or offering to lease, mineral rights off the entire
West Coast in plane coordinate blocks a maximum distance of over
100 miles southwest of San Clemente Island.9" This leasing program
operates without reference to water depth which is about 1400 meters
maximum between San Clemente and Cortes Bank, as shallow as
4 meters on parts of Cortes Bank, and from 400 meters to 4000 meters
beyond Cortes Bank; "
(4) Concluding treaties with the Soviet Union 11 and Japan
89 Id., p. 42.
90 See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Outer
Continental Shelf Leasing Map, La., No. 3B, 24 F.R. 6817, Aug. 21, 1959. The
issuance of such maps pursuant to 43 C.F.R. 3380.2 is clearly an official assump-
tion of jurisdiction by the United States of the map area.
91 U.S. Geological Survey, News Release, June 1, 1965.
92 U.S. Dept. of Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Outer Continental
Shelf Leasing Map, Calif., No. 6D, 31 F.R. 16629, Dec. 29, 1966.
03 See U.S. Coast & Geodetic Survey, Bathymetric Map, Santa Barbara to
Huntington Beach, Calif., No. 1206N-15 (Provisional), Jan. 1967. This is the
first in a series of Bathymetric Maps of the Continental Shelf of the U.S.
94 Agreement relating to fishing for king crab, Feb. 5, 1965, 16 U.S. Treaty
Series 24.
95 Agreement regarding king crab fishery in the eastern Bering Sea, Nov. 25,
1964, 15 U.S. Treaty Series 2066.
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regarding the taking of king crab in the southeastern Bering Sea east
of a line designated without reference to water depth or distances from
shore, although the depths involved are under 200 meters and the
center of the area is 150 miles from the Alaskan coasts.
Each of the foregoing examples of the assertion of sovereign
right has three characteristics:
(1) The area involved is specifically identified in clearly ascer-
tainable respects unconnected with either the water depth or distance
from shore.
(2) There is an existent specific purpose or use for which the
area is identified.
(3) There is an existent activity or threshold capability regard-
ing the specific purpose.
Considering these common characteristics, and considering that
the 200 meter depth criterion was adopted as the conceded minimum
exploitability depth criterion, and considering that the exploitability
depth criterion was adopted as a criterion of propinquity, it appears
that water depth is not significant in determining the seaward extent
of the coastal state's rights.
What clue, then, do the foregoing instances give to answer the
question: How wide is the juridical shelf?
Perhaps they indicate that this question is the wrong way to
state the problem because it assumes that a seaward political boundary
must be drawn on the seabed, blanketly extending national territorial
sovereignty over the intervening area.
The foregoing instances of United States assertion of sover-
eign rights in its adjacent seabed and similar assertions by other
states suggest that a better way to state the problem is: What is the
seaward extent of the coastal state's rights in the adjacent seabed?
The still-developing practice of states suggests that the answer is
that each coastal state will extend its jurisdiction and control seaward
in specific areas and for specific purposes of existent users and that
conflicts of interest which develop between nations will be solved
by the drawing of a political boundary only when there is no other
indicated solution.
Where does the foregoing analysis place the would-be founders
of "Abalonia"? Clearly Cortes Bank falls within the jurisdiction and
control of the United States. However, it seems doubtful that they
could be successfully prosecuted criminally for placing an unlicensed
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obstruction to navigation on the United States shelf because the pos-
sibility of criminal sanctions is too vaguely outlined in the statute.
But the possibility remains that they could be enjoined to remove the
obstruction.
Continental Shelf Boundaries Between Opposite and Adjacent States
Where two or more states face each other across intervening
submerged land which is conceded to be a juridical shelf or between
adjacent states, the parameters of the outer and lateral shelf b6undary
problem are more clear cut.
Article 6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf says that
such boundaries shall be determined by agreement or by a line which
is equidistant from baselines of the states.
The United States has potential boundary questions of this char-
acter in areas adjacent to Canada and Mexico and opposite Cuba and
the Bahamas. When technological capability and economic feasibility
foster exploration and exploitation of these areas, boundary questions
will be raised and become ripe for negotiation. The prospective need
for lateral boundary settlements with Canada and Mexico has begun
to shape up.
Near the United States-Canadian shelf area, Canada has begun
a leasing program. Here the status of Machias Seal Island and the
baseline of Nova Scotia is unclear, as interpretations of the location
of a median boundary line differ. Therefore, the Canadian leases
contain a provision that they are valid only for portions subject to
Canadian sovereignty.
Canada is also leasing areas in the Pacific off the entrance to
the Strait of Juan de Fuca which by differing interpretations of the
baseline might or might not be territory of the United States. United
States Department of the Interior leasing grids do not yet extend into
this area.
With regard to Mexico, differing interpretations of the base-
line across the "mouth" of the Rio Grande will produce differing
locations of the lateral boundary in the shelf. As a result the United
States Department of State has requested Texas not to issue leases
in this area and Department of the Interior leasing grids do not yet
extend to it.
The Pacific United States-Mexican lateral shelf boundary is
also not yet delimited and Department of the Interior leasing grids
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have not been extended to this vicinity. Here too the location of
the boundary will depend upon an interpretation of the baseline of
the mainland coast and San Clemente Island. In this area Forty
Mile Bank, rich in phosphate, has been an object of industry interests,
but the Department of Interior has refrained from leasing portions of
it because of the boundary uncertainty.
Accommodating Conflicting Uses
Much of Article 5 of the Shelf Convention is devoted to laying
down in very general terms principles applicable to conflicts between
exploitation activities and other uses of ocean space. In particular,
exploitation "must not result in any unjustifiable interference with
navigation." " The coastal state is authorized to place and maintain
exploitation installations and to take measures for their protection,
including the establishment of safety zones extending not more than
500 meters around them which all ships must respect."7 Due notice
must be given of the placing of such installations which must be
equipped with permanent warning devices and which must be removed
upon abandonment.9" Installations are expressly prohibited "where
interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes essential
to international navigation." "
The Convention has been criticized for failure to give more
specific guidelines.' 9 Such criticism fails to take account of the lesson
of centuries of legal history that workable rules of law cannot be pre-
fabricated in an abstract codification; they can only be derived from
experience.
In factual necessity and in law, it is for the coastal state in the
first instance to determine for its adjacent ocean space the necessary
adjustments between the interests involved in conflicting uses, even




97 Art. 5(2) and (3).
98 Art. 5(5).
99 Art. 5(6).
100 McDougal & Burke, Public Order of the Oceans, p. 721 (1962).
101 Cf. Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116: "The delimitation of sea areas
has always an international aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon the will
of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true that
the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal
State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with regard
to other States depends upon international law."
International Lawyer, Vol. I, No. 4
578/ INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
The Gulf of Mexico situation illustrates some of the practical
problems involved in the reconciliation of navigation and resource
exploitation. For example, the Convention provides that installations
must not interfere with "recognized sea lanes essential to international
navigation." '92 But, what is a "recognized sea lane essential to
international navigation" in an area which has traditionally been
crisscrossed by ships without the necessity of their having to avoid
installations? Once sea lanes are fixed, must they be regarded as
immutably fixed, as mariners would prefer, or may they reasonably
be relocated upon due notice in order to facilitate exploitation of
underlying resources? What are the criteria for determining how
wide a sea lane must be?
One of the most valuable results of the United States experience
in the Gulf of Mexico, and of the current ferment in the North Sea,. 3
could be the emergence of a body of accepted interpretations of the
Convention's generalized guidelines regarding the equitable recon-
ciliation of conflicting uses.
In most situations an absolute choice between conflicting uses
will most likely not be necessary. More likely, the problem will be
the reasonable accommodation of specific conflicting uses when all
relevant factors are taken into account. The relevant factors would
include: (1) The relative economic importance of the conflicting
uses to the states concerned. (2) The economic effect of any change
on the interested states. (3) The availability of alternative locations.
(4) The availability of alternative techniques. (5) The long-range
benefits or detriments to be derived from a particular solution. Doubt-
less there are other factors.1"'
Industry and Government Cooperation Reconciles
Gulf of Mexico Navigation and Oil Wells 10'
In the early days of oil exploration in the Gulf in the late 1940's
no one knew where wells would be established or how extensive they
102 Art. 5(6).
103 See Young, "Offshore Claims and Problems in the North Sea," 59 A.J.I.L.
505 (1965); and Thomas, "The North Sea and Its Environs: Future Reservoir
of Fuel?" LVI Geographical Review 12 (1966).
104 The factors and the underlying general problem are similar to the problem
of accommodating conflicting uses of international rivers, concerning which
there is a wealth of international experience and literature. See, e.g., Griffin,
"The Use of Waters of International Drainage Basins Under Customary Inter-
national Law," 53 A.J.I.L. 50 (1959).
11, For an expanded discussion see Griffin, "Ocean Navigation Fairways
Through Gulf of Mexico 'Oilfields,'" XLIV International Hydrographic Review
177 (1967), pub. by International Hydrographic Bureau, Monte-Carlo, Monaco.
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would be. The existence and extent of oil reservoirs could become
known only gradually through exploration and development over the
years. However, as early as 1948 the shipping industry perceived
that to prevent undue interference with navigation, shipping lanes
would have to be preserved through the rapidly expanding Gulf oil
fields. It took the problem to the Army Corps of Engineers because
of the Corps responsibility for the licensing of obstructions to navi-
gation in the territorial sea. The Corps of Engineers, in consulta-
tion with other interested Governmental agencies and the oil industry,
agreed that installations should not be allowed in agreed-upon lanes
and anchorages. In 1953 the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
extended the Corps authority in this regard beyond the territorial
sea. In 1954 the sea lane--or fairways- program was begun.
From the beginning of the fairways program there was com-
plete cooperation between the shipping industry, the oil industry, and
Government in locating and relocating the fairways. The fairways
program was conceived of as primarily a protective and defensive
measure. Shipping would not necessarily use the fairways exclusively
-if the oil industry desired to drill in a fairway, the shipping
industry would agree to shifting the fairway. There was no thought
of charting the fairways.
By the early 1960's, it had become clear that merely reserving
the fairways space, charting the oil installations, and publishing their
location in the "Notice to Mariners" was not sufficient. Although
the fairways and anchorage areas had been in existence since 1954,
some mariners tended to disregard them, perhaps sometimes through
reluctance to alter time-honored routes; but more often because
of unawareness of their location. Instances of collision, near-collision,
and navigation delays continued to multiply. Maximum benefits from
the fairways could only be achieved by marking them on the charts
actually used by mariners.
In mid-1962, the Corps of Engineers proposed to the interested
Governmental agencies that the fairways and anchorages be shown
on the nautical charts prepared and issued by the U.S. Coast and
Geodetic Survey.
After an April 1963 conference of Federal and State Government
officials in New Orleans considered the problems of charting the
fairways, it was decided to call a conference to obtain the views of
the shipping and oil industries. This conference met in June 10 to
106 Held June 20, 1963, at U.S. Army Engineers District Hdq., New Orleans.
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determine what could be done by Federal and State Government
agencies to foster safe navigation and at the same time promote
optimum development of natural resources of the continental shelf.
There was a complete and unrestrained exchange of ideas regarding
these conflicting objectives, with particular reference to aids to navi-
gation, use, location, width and length of fairways, their marking and
permanence, and the need and means of charting fairways.
The conference revealed a significant shift in the attitude of the
shipping industry toward the establishment and use of the fairways.
When oil installations first began to appear in the Gulf, the shipping
industry had wanted the fairways primarily as a defensive measure.
Ten years and 2,000 oil wells later, the shipping industry had come
to the position that in the interest of safe navigation the fairways
must be designated as permanent, must be marked and charted, and
that if this were done mariners would use them voluntarily.
The oil industry recognized the need for fairways for protection
of oil installations as well as ships; it was in favor of their being
marked and charted, but opposed to the concept of permanency of the
fairways if this meant they were to be immutable.
The matter of permanency of the fairways, upon examination,
proved to be more academic than real. From the beginning there had
been complete cooperation between shipping and oil interests in the
locating and relocating of the fairways. They had tended to become
substantially permanent in fact because over a ten-year period there
had been need for only two or three changes, which had been readily
agreed upon. The consensus of the meeting was that the fairways
and anchorages would remain in principle subject to modification but
only after due notification and consideration of the views of all inter-
ested parties.
Consensus was also readily achieved upon the next most impor-
tant matter, that of the width of the fairways.
From the navigator's viewpoint, the desirable width of a fair-
way is related in some degree to the type and completeness of the
channel marking and aids to navigation. In general, a two-mile wide
fairway is adequate.
From the oil producer's viewpoint, the desirable width of a
fairway is related in some degree to the technological capability of
directional drilling for different objective depths and purposes; the
greater the width of a fairway the greater is the financial burden of
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developing the resources. A fairway width of more than two miles
substantially eliminates the availability of any underlying resources.
Once a fairway is established, it is easier to try directional drilling than
it is to move the fairway.
With regard to the length and marking of fairways, the con-
sensus was readily achieved that each fairway must be considered
separately because each presents its own particular problem, the
factors being the draft of ships, the amount of traffic involved, the
degree of congestion of the installations, and the seaward limits of
oil activity.
Finally, it was felt that it would be unnecessary and undesirable
to attempt to require that ships must use the fairways. In bad weather
it might be impossible or unsafe to keep a ship within a fairway.
The ship's course should be within the master's judgment, depending
upon the circumstances. The consensus was that if the fairways were
charted, prudent mariners would normally use them. In the event
of a collision outside a fairway it is likely the courts and the Coast
Guard Marine Boards of Investigation will recognize the fairways
as they have recognized the concept of shipping lanes on the Great
Lakes.
By November 1965, the final administrative details were worked
out for formalizing, publicizing, and charting the fairways and anchor-
age areas at entrances to ports.
The fairways are known officially as "Shipping Safety Fairways
and Anchorage Areas, Gulf of Mexico."
Shipping is not required to use the lanes, but it is anticipated
they will normally be used because they provide safer entries and exits
at Gulf ports.
The fairways and anchorages will be shown on approximately
45 charts released by the Coast and Geodetic Survey over a three-
year period. The overall area covered by the 45 charts extends from
Charlotte Harbor on the Florida Gulf Coast to Brazos Santiago on
the Texas coast near the Mexican Border. The first charts to show
the fairways and anchorages (C&GS Nautical Charts 1115 and
1116) were issued in January 1966 and cover the Gulf coast from
Port St. Joe, Florida, to Galveston, Texas. (Fig. 4) The fairways
and anchorages will be added to the charts involved as they come up
for printing. These include 32 charts issued in 1966, eight in 1967,
and five in 1968.
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FIG. 4-Portion of C&GS Nautical Chart 1116 Showing Shipping Safety
Fairways in the Gulf of Mexico.
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The charts include this explanatory note:
Shipping Safety Fairways, shown by solid magenta lines estab-
lished from Corps of Engineers coordinate positions, are areas
wherein the Department of the Army has granted no permits
for structures pursuant to 33 U.S.C. 403 and 43 U.S.C. 1333
(f), nor does it expect to do so. This reservation is subject to
modification, but only after due notification and consideration
of the views of interested parties, and advance publication of
any adverse determination. Caution should be exercised when
approaching or navigating these fairways.
Official notice of the fairways and anchorages came into full
force and effect thirty days after publication in the Federal Register."'
Copies of the notice were sent to all known interested parties and
were also posted at post offices and other public places.
Jurisdiction
Contiguous Zone-Law Enforcement
Customary international law accords states the right to exercise
control over a belt of the high seas contiguous to their territorial sea
for the purpose of enforcing customs, fiscal, immigration, and sani-
tary regulations. This control does not change the high seat status
of the waters over which it is exercised. The Geneva Convention on
the Territorial Sea codified this right of control and limits it to a
zone 12 miles in width from the baseline.'08 Thus if a state claims
a 12-mile, or greater, width of territorial sea, the Convention precludes
it from claiming an additional law enforcement area.
Contiguous Zone-Fisheries
Many coastal states have a strong interest in obtaining some
control over their offshore fishery resources and protecting them
for the exclusive use of their local fishermen and from large foreign
fleets which can seriously damage the resource. Traditionally, the
breadth of the territorial sea determined the extent of a state's control
over its coastal fishery resources and so the practice was for a state
to extend the breadth of its territorial sea if it desired to protect its
coastal fisheries. The intertwining of these two issues at the 1958
Conference resulted in the Conventions' leaving unresolved the ques-
107 31 F.R. 955, Jan. 25, 1966.
108 Art. 24.
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tion of the extent to which a coastal state could claim exclusive fishery
rights in the high seas off its coasts.
At the 1960 Conference, the United States and Canada proposed
a 6-mile territorial sea and an additional 6-mile fishery zone beyond.
Although this proposal failed adoption by one vote, it established
the precedent of separating the two issues.
Since 1960 the practice of states has moved rapidly in the direc-
tion of establishing a customary rule of international law recognizing
a contiguous zone for fisheries out to 12 miles, or even beyond ac-
cording to some states, while retaining a narrower territorial sea.
Of the 91 coastal states for which there is information, 66 of them
now claim fishery jurisdiction of 12 miles or beyond, and 41 have
made this separation and claim a more narrow territorial sea. The
most outstanding example of this development occurred in 1965 when
14 major European states agreed on a 12-mile fishery zone and left
unchanged the width of their territorial sea. Canada has done like-
wise."'
A separate approach to these two issues was urged in a reso-
lution adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Asso-
ciation in 1964, instigated by the Law of the Sea Committee of the
Section on International and Comparative Law.11
In 1965 S. 2218 was introduced in the Senate. "To establish
a contiguous fishery zone beyond the territorial sea of the United
States" nine nautical miles wide measured from the outer limits of
the 3-mile territorial sea. The Department of State testified that the
establishment of such a zone would not be contrary to international
law but that a unilateral wider extension would be unlawful.11' The
Bill became law in 1966 112 and must be read in pari materia with
the 1964 Act providing penalties for foreign fishing in United States
territorial waters or "within any waters in which the United States
has the same rights in respect to fisheries as it has in its territorial
waters. ,, 113
The exclusion of foreign fishing in the United States fisheries
contiguous zone is "subject to the continuation of traditional fishing
109 This paragraph is based on Twelve-Mile Fishery Zone, Report [to accom-
pany S. 2218], Cmte. on Commerce, U.S. Sen., Rep. No. 1280, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess., pp. 4-6.
110 Quoted in full, id., p. 7.
1 Id., pp. 2 and 10.
112 P.L. 89-658, 80 Stat. 908, Oct. 14, 1966.
113P.L. 88-308, 78 Stat. 194, May 20, 1964; 16 U.S.C. 1081-1085 (1964).
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by foreign states within the zone as may be recognized by the United
States." 114 This provision is intended to put the United States in a
position to negotiate permanent agreements with foreign states for
the reciprocal recognition of historic fisheries. For many years U.S.
fishermen have fished in the close coastal waters of Canada, Mexico,
and many Central and South American states. Canadians have
fished for many years in areas of United States coastal waters."1
Deep Seabed and Subsoil
The high seas is the ocean surface and water column that are not
included within the internal waters or territorial sea of any state.
The principle of freedom of the high seas means that the high sea
is in law res communis, a thing common to all states, not capable of
being subjected to sovereignty, in which every state has equal rights
and duties.
Freedom of the high seas in regard to jurisdiction does not mean
the high sea is subject to no state's jurisdiction. It means the high
sea is subject to the jurisdiction of each state but, with limited excep-
tion, only as to its nationals and ships.
Freedom of the high sea in regard to use means that each state
has the right to use and exploit the high sea, except as to a fisheries
contiguous zone, and each state has the duty to respect the similar
right of other states.
For years the treatises of learned international law academicians
have debated whether the seabed or subsoil of the high seas is res
communis like the water above it or whether it is simply territory
covered by water and therefore res nullius, the "thing of no one" over
which sovereignty can be acquired."'
The latter view seems now to be well on its way to victory by
reason of the continental shelf doctrine which assigns sea bottom
sovereign rights to the adjacent coastal state. This raises the question
of the mode by which states would claim to acquire sovereignty of
the deep sea bottom.
Propinquity is the basis for allocating to the coastal state sover-
eign rights in the seabed and subsoil of internal waters, territorial
sea, and the continental shelf. The juridical shelf terminates where
114 Note 13, Sec. 1.
115 Note 10, pp. 9-10.
116 See Waldock, "The Legal Basis of Claims to. the Continental Shelf,".
Grotius Society, Transactions for the Year 1950 (1951), pp. 115, 116-118.
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propinquity terminates. If sovereignty is to be acquired beyond that
point in the deep sea bottom under the high seas no mere paper
claim of one state will be respected by other states who will have
brought to fruition the now nascent technology of human requirements
and capabilities under water.
It must be anticipated that claims to sovereignty of the deep
sea bottom will be predicated upon "effective occupation." In view
of the tribunals' opinions in the cases of the Island of Palmas,"'
Eastern Greenland,"8 and Clipperton Island ... it seems clear that
"effective occupation" means only the minimum display of state ac-
tivity which the nature of the deep sea bottom calls for.
Short of claims to sovereignty, states may seek to carve out
an area of sea bottom for a particular exclusive use, or for all pur-
poses, for a short or longer period. Coastal states may seek to buffer
the outer limits of their continental shelf with underwater contiguous
zones of limited exclusive authority.
Propinquity as the basis for allocating rights in the continental
shelf has the virtue of preserving shelf resources for the benefit of a
technological "have-not" coastal state until it can exploit them for
itself or by lease to others.
Effective occupation as the basis for allocating rights in the
deep sea bottom will mean a race between the technological "have"
states with the technological "have-nots" as spectators. The undesira-
bility of such a race is self-evident.1
2
1
117 22 A.J.I.L. 867 (1928).
118 (1931), P.C.I.J., Series A-B, No. 53.
119 27 A.J.I.L. 390 (1932).
120 This does not necessarily mean that resources beyond the continental shelf
should be placed under the ownership of the UN, which is proposed in "New
Dimensions for the United Nations: The Problems of the Next Decade," 17th
Rep., Comm. to Study the Organization of Peace, p. 41 (1966). Concern over
the prejudging of this question led the Law of the Sea Committee, Sec. of Int.
and Comp. Law, A.B.A., to propose the following resolution which was adopted
by the House of Delegates (52 A.B.A. Journal 973, Oct. 1966):
WHEREAS, the vast natural resources in and under the high seas are becom-
ing through technological progress increasingly available to mankind in ways
until recently unforeseen, and
WHEREAS, the formulation of sound legal principles in this field is a matter
of great importance to the welfare and security of the United States, and can only
be accomplished with full appreciation of the political, economic and scientific
factors involved.
BE IT RESOLVED by the American Bar Association that prior to framing
any policy vis-a-vis other nations with respect to sea resources not covered by
existing law, the United States Government be urged to review thoroughly the
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Perhaps the biggest challenge to the emerging law of ocean space
will be to balance the interests of the world community and individual
states in order to maximize the beneficial uses of global ocean space
in the self-interest of all. Such a policy of the United States was
charted by President Johnson in his remarks at the commissioning of
the Coast and Geodetic Survey's new research ship, OSS Oceanog-
rapher, on July 13, 1966:
We meet here today at the beginning of a new age of
exploration.
To some, this might mean our adventures in outer space.
But I am speaking of exploring an unknown world at our door-
step. It is really our last frontier here on earth. I am speaking
of mountain chains that are yet to be discovered, of national
resources that are yet to be tapped, of a vast wilderness that is
yet to be charted.
This is the sea around us. . . . Truly great accomplish-
ments in oceanography will require the cooperation of all the
maritime nations of the world. Today I send our voice out from
this platform calling for such cooperation, requesting it and
urging it. . . . Under no circumstances, we believe, must we
ever allow the prospects of rich harvest and mineral wealth to
create a new form of colonial competition among the maritime
nations. We must be careful to avoid a race to grasp and to hold
the lands under the high seas. We must ensure that the deep
seas and the ocean bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of all
human beings. 12
1
issues at stake in consultation with representatives of the American Bar Associa-
tion and others competent in the field of international law, with scientific and
technical experts and with leaders of American industry interested in oceanic
development.
The Law of the Sea Committee, in proposing the foregoing resolution also had
in mind the "Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966,"
P.L. 89-454,.80 Stat. 203, June 17, 1966. The Act creates, in the Executive Office
of the President, the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering
Development, to, inter alia, "develop a comprehensive program of marine
science activities" and "undertake a comprehensive study . . . of the legal
problems" relating to marine resources. The Act also creates a Commission to
review the needs for marine resources, review programs and recommend a
Governmental organizational plan.
121 White House Press Release, July 13, 1966.
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